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
Probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes, by
which the mind is not allow'd to x on either side, but incessantly tost from
one to another, and one moment is determin'd to consider an object as ex-
istent, and at another moment as the contrary. The imagination or under-
standing, call it which you please, uctuates betwixt the opposite views. . . 
(Hume,(1739-1740)[1978]p. 440)
1 Introduction
The idea of we-thinking, or we-reasoning, is increasingly drawing the at-
tention of more and more economists. In its general formulation, it has
been proposed by David Hodgson (1967), Donald Regan (1980), Margaret
Gilbert (1989), Susan Hurley (1989), Raimo Tuomela (1995), and Martin
Hollis (1998). Within this body of literature, Robert Sugden (1993, 2000,
2003) and Michael Bacharach (1995, 1997, 1999, 2006) have developed an-
alytical frameworks from an economic point of view. The main claim of
scholars that analyze we-thinking is that it can be endorsed by people when
they face a decision problem. In fact, experimental evidence shows that,
especially in some kind of games, such as coordination games, people do en-
dorse we-thinking
1
.However, the way in which we-thinking arises and how
it brings people to behave in a particular way in games is a matter that
requires further investigation.
The two main contributors are Bacharach and Sugden, and they approach
the topic in two dierent ways. Sugden's aim is to show that we-reasoning is

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See Tan and Zizzo (2008) for a review of experiments.
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a consistent and logical way of thinking, but he does not face the problem of
how we-reasoning can arise. He gives some intuitions only about a psycholog-
ical background based on Smith's analysis of correspondence of sentiments.
Bacharach's theory is based on frames and his never reached aim (because
of his death) was to explain we-thinking in terms of Variable Frame Theory
(Bacharch 1993). But, as we shall see later, some of his intuitions conict
with the logical analysis he proposes. His logical analysis was developed by
Zizzo and Tan (2003, 2008): They introduce a `game harmony' measure, as
a proxy of the extent of cooperation or conict in games. Game harmony
could represent a step forward towards the endogenization of the probability
that we-thinking could arise in a decision problem.
In the present paper, I take a dierent approach to the way in which
we-thinking works. Based on a not fully developed intuition of Bacharach's,
that does not entirely t into his logical analysis, i.e. the `double-crossing'
problem in Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game, I propose a framework in which
a person is allowed to have both I-thoughts, when she is we-reasoning, and
we-concepts, when she is I-reasoning, and develop my analysis in terms of
equilibrium concepts.
2 Bacharach's theory of we-thinking
The answers to fundamental questions about coordination and coopera-
tion. . . lie in the agent's conception not of the objects of choice, nor of the
consequences, but of herself and of the agents with whom she is interact-
ing(Bacharach, M., N. Gold and R. Sugden 2006, p. 70). This sentence is
the starting point of Bacharach's analysis of we-reasoning.
2
We-reasoning is
2
It is interesting to see how and when Bacharach developed the idea of we-thinking.
He started by building the Variable Frame theory (Bacharach 1993), in parallel he was
developing a theory of cooperation. In 1995 he introduced the category of `fellow member
reasoner': Someone who is a member of a natural type T and chooses a certain strategy
if she is suciently sure that her interactants are also member of T (- 1995, p.1). In
this context he tries to link T-membership to variable frame theory and, at for the rst
time he introduces the `we' category: The present paper has made type T membership
an issue which type T members think about, and nuanced their capacity to recognize
it. An alternative development would make T membership a variable element in players'
frames in the sense of variable frame theory: that is, a player might or might not think
about the game in terms of whether she and her coplayers belong to T. In the case in
which T is the player set, we may put this by saying that a player may or may not
think in `we' terms about how to play the game. The more inclined a player is to `we'
thinking, and the more inclined she takes coplayers to be, the more will fellow-member
reasoning be favoured (p.17). In 1997 Bacharach formally introduces we-thinking, but, at
the same time, he claims that we-reasoning is dierent from team-thinking: the essence
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seen as a powerful `mechanism' (in Bacharach's words) for solving puzzles
about cooperation and coordination in game theory (i.e. games like Hi-Lo
and Prisoner Dilemma). More in general, in his work Bacharach tries to
demonstrate, by showing some evidence,
3
that we-reasoning is a valid mode
of reasoning and people do endorse it.
His theory is based on frames: if we-frame comes to mind, the subject
will group identify and then she will start to we-reason. A frame can be
dened as a set of concepts that an agent uses when she is thinking about
a decision problem. It cannot be chosen, and how it comes to mind is a
psychological process: Her frame stands to her thoughts as a set of axes
does to a graph; it circumscribes the thoughts that are logically possible for
her (not ever but at the time). In a decision problem, everything is up for
framing. . . also up for framing are her coplayers, and herself. (ib. p. 69).
In Bacharach's framework, then, a person may start to we-reason only if she
has `we' concepts in her frame: in other words, a person rstly recognizes
the we-perspective, and then endorses it.
The `framing' perspective is not the only way in which the theory of
we-thinking has been proposed, however. Robert Sugden, for example, has
developed a dierent framework for looking at the problem. In his framework
the central concept is the `common reason to believe'
4
: people who group
identify are not committed to reason as a team unless there is a common
reason to believe that other agents are doing the same. The psychological
of team thinking is that each player participates in the group-best prole in conditions
of common knowledge that they form a `team'  that is, that they all act in this way
(p.13). The theory of `team-reasoning' he has in mind was proposed by Robert Sugden
in 1993. This was a seminal paper in Sugden's research project on we-thinking. In fact
later versions of his theory (see Sugden 2000, 2003) do not assume the participation of all
subject to participate and the common knowledge hypothesis. The rst published paper
in which Bacharach formalizes his theory is the 1999's article about `interactive team
reasoning'. In it Bacharach introduces some elements that we can nd in the book, such
as, group identication, team reasoning as the eect of group identication, unreliable
team interaction, that in the book becomes cirscumspect team reasoning, etc. Between
the '99 article and the book we may nd some lecture notes, in which the concepts of
agency and `superagency' begin to appear. The book represents an (incomplete, because
of his death) attempt to build a complete theory of we-thinking.
3
Bacharach claims that there are ve kinds of evidence: logical, introspective, evolu-
tionary, transcendental and experimental (see Bacharach 2006, pp.145-146).
4
Common reason to believe is dened as follows: there is common reason to believe
to a preposition p in a set of individual T if: (i) for all individuals i in T, i has reason to
believe p (i.e. p can be inferred from propositions that she accepts as true n.d.a.); (ii) for
all individuals I and j in T, I has reason to believe that j has reason o believe p; (iii) for
all individuals I, j, and k in T, I has reason to believe, that j has reason to believe that k
has reason to believe p; and so on (Gold and Sugden 2008, p. 302).
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side of group identication in Sugden's theory might be found in his analysis
of Smith's `correspondence of sentiments' (Sugden, R. 2005): `fellow-feeling',
could be seen as the source of group identication. In sum, in Bacharach's
framework if people group identify they automatically start to reason like
a team, whereas in Sugden's theory people may group identify, but team
reasoning does not follow automatically.
Sugden's framework can be summarized as in gure 1.
Figure 1: Sugden's framework
Bacharach's aim is to explain situations in which some people may `we'-
reason and some other may not. In order to model the previous intuition, he
assumes that a frame `we' can come to mind with a probability `w', which
represents the probability for a subject to group-identify. The probability w
is common knowledge
5
, in fact: in coming to frame a situation as a problem
`for us', an individual also gain some sense of how likely it is that another
individual would frame it in the same way (Bacharach, Gold and Sugden
2006 p. 163). A context in which some people may group-identify and some
may not is seen by Bacharach as an unreliable coordination context, and
team reasoning in this context is called circumspect team reasoning.
In Bacharach's theory group identication is a framing phenomenon that
determines choices by changing the logic by which people reason about what
to do (ib). If, by reasoning in the individual standard mode (I-reasoning),
an agent looks at a decision problem by thinking what it would be the best
for her to do, when there is group identication, the agent will think: What
would the best be for us to do?. Basically then, Somebody `team reasons'
if she works out the best feasible combination of actions for all the members
of her team, then does her part in it(Bacharach 2006 p.121).
Sugden describes team reasoning in a similar way: The idea is that, in
relation to a specic decision problem, an individual may conceive of herself
as a member of a group or team, and conceive of the decision problem, not
as a problem for her but as a problem for the team. In other words, the
5
In a previous work (1999), Bacharach has developed a more formalized model, in
which each agent can participate or lapse in a team and everyone, before choosing, receive
a signal knowing the joint probability distribution of this signal and agent's state (i.e. an
agent's signal includes her participation state).
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individual frames the problem, not as `What should I do?', but as `What
should we do?' (2000, pp. 182-183).
Trying to go deeper into the matter, Bacharach aims to explain how
a frame, in particular a we-frame, may come to mind. In his earlier works
(Bacharach, M. 1997, 1999) he proposes that the possibility of team reasoning
is related to having `scope for cooperation' and to the `harmony of interests'.
In his last book he suggests the (strong) Interdependence Hypothesis,
that roughly states: perceived interdependence prompts group identication.
The perception of interdependence between two agents in a game is given by
three factors:
 common interest (the agents have common interest in s* over s, if both
prefer s* to s, where s*, s are possible state of aairs, or, in a game,
possible outcomes)
 copower (nobody can reach s* alone, but both can together)
 standard solution (basically Nash equilibrium that may realise s).
Bacharach says that if the two agents have common interest in s* over s and
copower over it, and the standard solution of the game contains outcomes in
s (this is the case of PD), then people are stimulated to group identify. In
other words, if s is a possible outcome of the individual rationality, and s* is
strictly Pareto-preferred by both the agents, and they have common power
to bring about s*, then group identication is stimulated. Or, if the outcome
that can be reached by an individual way of reasoning is Pareto-dominated
by another outcome achievable only by thinking as a group, there is space
for group identication.
We may summarize Bacharach' framework in the scheme in gure 2.
Figure 2: Bacharach's framework
The main Bacharach's purpose is to explain cooperation, seen as a suc-
cessful group activity (see 2006 p. 69), and the core mechanism for doing
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that comprehends `framing', `common purpose', and `cooperation': (i) we
frame ourselves as members of groups; (ii) . . . perceived agreement of individ-
ual goals among a set of individuals favours framing as members of a group
with this common goal; (iii) the group framing tends to issue in ecient
cooperation for the group goal (p.90). People then cooperate because they
group identify.
3 We-thinking and Variable Frame Theory
Bacharch's (never reached) aim was to explain we-reasoning in terms of Vari-
able Frame Theory (VFT), which he had developed in a earlier stage of his
investigation
6
. Concisely, in VFT a player can intentionally choose an ob-
ject, or an action, if she has a way of thinking about that object or that
action, i.e. he has a frame. Frames can be more or less salient or available,
depending on a probability measure on them. A decision rule in VFT is a
mapping from frames to options induced by those frames (Bacharach, M.
2001a), and an equilibrium for symmetrical games is dened as follows: the
pair (d,d) is a variable frame equilibrium if, for each Frame F, the option
d(F) is subjectively best from the perspective of F against d as perceived
in F (ib.). In other words the decision rule d(F) has to be the best reply
against d.
The intersection between VFT and we-thinking would have been called
by Bacharach `Variable agency theory' (Bacharach 2006, p.59). However, he
could not complete the description of `we'-reasoning in terms of VFT. In fact,
there are at least two problems to solve, in order to complete Bacharach's
theory: one is related to the way he conceives the `we' frame, the other is
the endogenization of w.
In Bacharach's circumspect team reasoning, as I have said before, if peo-
ple group identify, then the we-frame comes to their mind and they start to
we-reason. It seems as though in Bacharach's framing theory there are two
aspects that are deeply linked: in framing a situation, the rst step is to
recognize a frame, that is coming to see it; the second step is endorsing that
frame, i.e. reasoning as the frame allows you to do. In Bacharach's theory
group identication means not only endorsing a particular way of reasoning,
but also coming to see it. The `compression' between the two aspects of
framing is due to the VFT. In it in fact, changing frame does not mean to
change the way of reasoning and the decision problem for a subject is fully
determined by the interplay of his frame and the objective world.
6
See Bacharach 1993, 2001
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Because of this `compression', Bacharach in his theory of we-thinking
cannot allow people to use more than one frame at a time. In a certain sense,
as it has been noticed by Gold and Sugden (Bacharach, Gold and Sugden
2006), in we frame people become committed to we-reason: In the theory
of team reasoning, an individual who reasons in the `we' frame is aware of
the `I' frame too (as one of that other players might use) but acknowledge
only `we' reasons. It seems that group identication involves something more
that framing in the sense of variable frame theory: the group-identier does
not merely become aware of group concepts, she also becomes committed to
the priority of group concepts over individual ones (p.199).
The fact that people cannot use more that one frame at time and they
cannot reason about frames whilst thinking of which frame to endorse, pre-
vents Bacharach to develop analytically one of his intuitions. In fact, taking
the most famous game in terms of cooperation, the PD game, as an example,
Bacharach says: In a Prisoner's Dilemma, players might see only, or most
powerfully, the feature of common interest and reciprocal dependence which
lie in the payos on the main diagonal (p.86). If this happens, players do
cooperate. But, it might be the case that they might see the problem in
other ways. For example, someone might be struck by the thought that her
coplayer is in a position to double-cross her by playing D in the expectation
that she will play C. This perceived feature might inhibit group identica-
tion (ib).
Here Bacharach seems to have in mind some psychological process which
inhibits group identity which is not quite represented by his own concept of
interdependence  the idea of `double-crossing'. The reason this idea doesn't
t his framework is that double-crossing is the incentive to act on individual
reasoning when one believe the other is acting on team reasoning. This
requires that the player uses both frames at the same time, while thinking
about which one to use. Or, in other words, a player, in order to recognize
the `double-cross' threat, should be allowed to imagine himself in a we-frame,
and then deliberating to cooperate, but at the same time he should use the
I-frame by thinking that the other player would take advantage of her. In
the rst player's conjecture, the other player too should use the we-frame in
order to think that the rst player could choose to cooperate, and, at the
same time, she should use I-frame in order to think how `double cross' the
rst player.
In the theory of we-thinking the way in which a person reasons (I-mode
or we-mode) is a consequence of the perceived frame. So, if a person is
in we-frame she cannot reason in the standard theoretical mode, and then
she cannot `see' the double-crossing threat. She may switch from I-mode of
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reasoning to we-reasoning (if we-frame comes to mind), or not. Bacharach,
then, does not seem to take into account the possibility that once we are
in the we-frame, we may switch to I-mode of reasoning, or better, he allows
the possibility of switching frame, but does not allow a person to be able to
visualize switching frames. And this is why he cannot represent his `double-
crossing' intuition. It seems that when the we frame is perceived, it is also
perceived as the correct frame or dominant frame, so that once a person sees
the world this way she cannot visualize going back to seeing it the other
(compare illusions, myths, lies  `the scales fell from my eyes').
In eect, in one of his unpublished papers (Bacharach, M. 1997), Bacharach
allowed for the possibility of the existence of three frames: the I frame, the
We frame and the `S' (superordinate) frame. We and I are called simple
frames: players in them begin their reasoning with the two basic conceptu-
alization of the situation, as `what shall we do?' problem and `what shall I
do?' problem respectively (p. 5). A S frame is active when someone man-
ages during deliberation to see the problem from both the we and the I/she
perspectives(p.14). Although Bacharach allows for the existence of S, based
on psychological attainments, he states that we and I perspectives cannot be
held simultaneously: Although we can switch self-identities rather easily,
we appear to be unable to inhabit more than one at a time (p.15). This
seems to be a contradiction, and in fact this assumption leads Bacharach to
introduce a solution concept that imposes, in his words a stringent require-
ment (p.21). He assumes that I thoughts in S frame generate a personal
evaluation, whereas we thoughts generate a group evaluation. The solution
concept in the model roughly states that the cooperative option is chosen by
a player in S if it is the best (against the mix of the coplayer's generated by
his varying frame p.21 -) in group evaluation and not worse than the other
option in personal evaluation.
The S-frame intuition of 1997 unpublished paper, however, disappeared
in subsequent pieces of work, but also the hypothesis that agent can `vacillate'
between the two frames does not appear in the most recent Bacharach's
eort: the book.
Later on, in developing the VFT Bacharach faces the issue of integrabil-
ity of frames. He says that normally frames are integrable: It is easy to
integrate frames which consist of classiers such as shape, colour and posi-
tion: we can easily see a mark as a triangle, as a blue triangle, as a blue
triangle on the left,. . . on the other hand. . . a person can see the marks
as letters and as geometric shapes, but not at the same time  you can't
integrate these two perception (2001 a, p.6). There exist frames, then, that
are non-integrable. `I' and `we' frames appear non integrable in Bacharach's
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words, and when this happens, the agent may nd herself vacillating be-
tween the judgments that she should do (ib.). In spite of these attempts,
then, `double-cross' threat has not been enclosed in Bacharach's analytical
framework.
I shall suggest later that it is possible to take into account what Bacharach
called `personal' and `group' evaluation, by reasoning in terms of deviation
from an equilibrium and not in terms of frames. Or better, it is possible to
do that, if we separate the two aspects of framing: how a frame might come
to mind and how people endorse a particular frame when she sees more than
one frame. In this way it would become possible to represent double-cross
intuition.
The second unsolved problem is the endogenization of w. Bacharach tries
to endogenize w, because he sees that the fact that w is exogenous represents
a lacuna in his theory. We may see a clear evolution in his thoughts along
the years: in 1997 and 1999 papers he sees w as a function of the gain
from cooperation and the harmony of interests: To endogenize w, and other
feature of W, one must show that the payos and other constitutive features of
the basic game make collective identity salient or otherwise tend to induce
team-thinking. The laboratory evidence is promising, as it suggests that
group identication may be induced by the `common problem' mechanism'.
In addition, it is plausible that w may be an increasing function of certain
quantitative features of the payo structure, such as `scope for co-operation'
and `harmony of interest' (1999, p.144). In 2001 he turns to other two
features: We need a link from the game parameters to the onset of group
identication. Two of the classic favouring conditions are commonness of
interests and commonness of predicament (2001 b, p.8). In his book he
goes deeper into the matter, as we have seen, by stating the interdependence
hypothesis. But he does not complete the work: It may also be that there
is a positive relationship between salience and eectiveness: when a feature
tending to promote self-identity is highly salient, then if and when it is
noticed it is also highly eective. These are empirical speculations; their
investigation will be an important part of the future development of the
theory of group action (2006, p. 87).
A step forward on this topic has been made by Tan and Zizzo (Tan, J.
and D. Zizzo 2008): in their paper there is an attempt to investigate the re-
lationship between harmony of interests (`game harmony' for them), group
identication and cooperation. They claim that game harmony is a good
measure of the extent of cooperation or conict in games. However, in ex-
periments and in real life, we often observe what they call excess conict
or cooperation relative to theoretical predictions. In their framework, it is
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group identication that can explain excess in-group cooperation and excess
out-group conict. They also believe that the so called `perceived harmony'
can capture the eect of team reasoning on cooperation. This is a theoret-
ical construct and it has not been tested yet. At the same time `perceived
harmony' cannot be inferred by the payos of the game, because it is a sort
of `experimental' measure (similarity index in experiments  how subjects
think a game is similar to a pure coordination game or to a zero-sum game
- is a proxy for perceived harmony). Anyway, the simple game harmony
(not the perceived one) is the best existent proxy for what Bacharach has
called `the harmony of interest', and it is entirely derived from the payos
of the game. Game harmony, dened as a generic property describing how
harmonious or disharmonious the interests of players are, as embodied in the
payos (Tan and Zizzo 2008, p. 3), is based on the correlation coecient
between payo pairs. This measure can be a solution of Bacharach's problem
of endogenization of w. However, as we shall see in section n. 6 it presents
some problems. In the next section, I will show a possible way to represent
Bacharach's intuition of `double-cross' problem.
4 Representing the `double-cross intuition': rea-
soning in terms of deviations from equilibrium
Looking at the situation and at the way of reasoning from another perspective
may help us to enrich the analysis. In what follows, I shall reason in terms of
individual and collective rationality as two alternative ways of approaching
a decision problem, and in particular I shall focus on reasons for deviating
from an equilibrium.
First of all, I suppose that the group utility function of a combination of
actions (a1, a2), when the players are P1 and P2, is U(a1, a2) = (u1(a1, a2)
+ u2(a1, a2))/2
7
, where u1(a1, a2) and u2(a1, a2) are the player's payos.
A player who team reasons, rst computes which is the best prole for the
group
8
, and then he does its part in it. A player who `I'-reasons follows the
standard theoretic predictions of game theory.
It is possible to classify games in terms of reasoning on deviations. The
basic idea is that a person may reason in the standard I-mode, or in we-mode,
but she may have both frames (I and we) in mind (perhaps not at the same
time, if the non-integrability hypothesis is correct, but vacillating between
7
This formulation is the most used one in literature.
8
The best prole is calculated allowing for `unreliable' contexts, and then taking into
account the possibility that not everybody will group-indentify.
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them). In standard game theory an equilibrium is dened as a combination
of actions in which no player has anything to gain by changing unilaterally
her own strategy. In we-reasoning theory, an equilibrium is instead dened
as a combination of actions in which the whole group cannot gain anything
by switching from this combination to another. Deviation is seen then as
a test for the existence of an equilibrium, no matter if I or we-equilibrium.
In what follows, I shall simply test games in search for equilibria that hold
from both I and we point of view.
Table 1: game A
L R
H 3,3 4,1
L 1,4 2,2
Take, for example, the game A (tab. 1). The combination of actions
(H.L) is a Nash equilibrium. In it, in fact neither row player nor column
player has reason to unilaterally deviate from that combination of actions.
But the same combination is also a we-equilibrium: as a group both players
cannot do anything better by switching to another combination
9
.
Table 2: game B
L R
H 2,2 3,0
L 0,3 2,2
Game B shows a unique Nash equilibrium, (H,L) and two we-equilibria,
(H,L) and (L,R), but only the (H,L) combination is an equilibrium at the
same time for I and we-reasoners.
Table 3: game C
L R
H 3,3 1,1
L 1,1 2,2
Game C is an Hi-Lo game, and as it is well known, it has two Nash
equilibria, i.e. (H,L) and (L,R), but only one we-equilibrium that is (H,L).
9
The utility U for the group is 3 in (H,L) combination, 2.5 in both (H,R) and (L,L),
and 2 in (L,R).
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Table 4: game D
L R
H 3,3 1,4
L 4,1 2,2
Prisoner's Dilemma game, instead, has one Nash equilibrium (L,R) and
one we-equilibrium (L,R), but they do not coincide.
If an equilibrium live through both, I and we, deviation tests, it is strong,
in the sense that it allows for the existence of both ways of reasoning. At the
same time such equilibrium could be seen as a renement when more than
one equilibrium exists. In game B, for example, there are two we-equilibria,
but if we allow players to see the game endorsing both I and we concepts,
this could help them to recognize that (H,L) equilibrium is the prominent
one, because it passes both deviation tests. In this case, having an I thought
helps we-reasoners to select an equilibrium. But the opposite can happen as
it is in the Hi-Lo game, where there are two Nash equilibria and we-thoughts
can help I-reasoners to choose the (H,L) equilibrium.
The double test for deviation could also be seen in terms of deliberations,
and not only as a method for testing the existence of an equilibrium. The
scheme in g. n. 7 represents a possible way to classify the previous games
in terms of deliberation.
Figure 3: Reasoning about deviations and deliberations
Take for example the game A: in this game, if I start to reason in the
standard I-mode we, as a group will be happy with the result (H,L), i.e. we
won't want to deviate jointly from the I-reasoning `solution'. On the oppo-
site, if I group identify, and then I look for the best solution for the group,
I as an individual will be happy with the result, i.e. I won't want to deviate
unilaterally from the we-reasoning solution. So, in this game, the same result
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will be reached, independently of the particular way of reasoning. We may
say that I or we-reasoning are observationally indierent because they give
the same result in terms of choice. Looking at this game from Bacharach's
perspective (at least my interpretation of it), I notice that this game does
not possess the features that prompt we-reasoning (because the individual
solution is not Pareto-dominated). This example illustrates how Bacharach's
perspective does not appraise we solutions from the I perspective, but only
the other way round. One may represent Bacharach's criterion as the answer
to the following question: is there an I-solution which we are unhappy with?
This will be represented by the lower part of the scheme (and in fact coor-
dination games and prisoner's dilemma games are considered by Bacharach
as games in which we-reasoning can arise).
But there could be dierent situations. Let us look at the game B: in
this case, if I start with I-mode, there will be a unique Nash equilibrium
(H,L), that is also one of the two possible (and indierent) we-solutions. If I
start with I-mode, we shall then be happy with the result. But, if we group
identify and we-reason, if we-reasoning gets us to (H, L), I am happy. If it
gets us to (L, R), I am unhappy. So the end of the story is the outcome (H,
L), either by we-reasoning or by I-reasoning. This result is observationally
equivalent to I-reasoning but not to we-reasoning, because the latter allows
(L, R). For the same reasons as before, the game B belongs to the border
line in Bacharach's view (I and we solution are the same in terms of payo).
Game C, instead (the Hi-Lo game), will prompt we-reasoning: if I start
with I-mode we won't be happy, because I cannot choose between the two
NE, only one of which is also a we-solution; but if we group identify I will
be happy with the result.
The last game, the Prisoner's Dilemma game, is the most interesting: if
I start with I-reasoning, we won't be happy (the NE is Pareto-dominated by
the we solution). But if we group identify the we solution is not good for me
(I would be better o by playing the other strategy). In this case there can
be a continuous switching from a frame to another. In fact, in the experi-
ment on the PD game, we observe a rate of cooperation of about 50% (see
Sally 1995). Following Bacharach's theory, the PD, as we have seen, is the
typical game that can lead to we-reason, by prompting the `interdependence
hypothesis'. In the framework I have presented, instead, the `double-cross'
intuition is taken into account, and this generate a perpetual shift, and then
we-reasoning is only one of the two equally possible solutions. It is plausi-
ble that in cases like this, the salience of frames will play a key-role in the
selection of the solution of the game.
This way of looking at a decision problem does not tell us which frame
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is more likely to appear. But, if a frame comes to mind, within this classi-
cation, we may see, depending on the kind of game the subject is facing,
if the frame will be stable or not. However, `being happy with the results'
sometimes depends on which solution is selected. In game B, starting with
WE, I may or may not be happy. In game C, starting with I, WE may or
may not be happy. We must read, then, the line `yes' in the classication of
g. 3, as the situation in which agents are not willing to deviate whatever
solution will be selected.
5 Discussion
As I said before, my analysis tries to expand an intuition not fully devel-
oped by Bacharach. Tan and Zizzo's proposal is also a way of developing
Bacharach's analysis. It is possible to make a comparison in terms of predic-
tions, between Bacharach's view, based on strong interdependence hypothe-
sis, Tan and Zizzo's `game harmony' and my own proposal. Let us see the
scheme in table 5.
Table 5:
GAME
BACHARACH'S
PREDICTION
GAME
HARMONY
PREVAILING WAY
OF REASONING
A I-reasoning - 0,8 I or We
B Border Line -0,9 I
C We-reasoning 1 We
D We-reasoning -0,8
Conict (perpetual
shift)
Game A does not t the interdependence hypothesis, and then, in Bacharach's
framework it prompts I-reasoning. It has a negative harmony, and then in
Tan and Zizzo's framework it is seen as a conictual game. In my frame-
work, both I and we-reasoning are possible and both of them lead to the
same solution of the game. Game B, instead, belongs to the borderline in
terms of interdependence, because the I solution of the game is not strictly
Pareto-dominated, but equal to the we-solution. It is seen as conictual
game in terms of harmony and the prevailing way of reasoning it prompts is
I. Game C, the Hi-lo game has the same prediction from every point of view.
In contrast, the PD game could bring an agent to team reason by following
Bacharach; it is conictual in terms of game harmony (and then does not
lead to cooperative option); and it can lead to a perpetual shift in term of
14
reasoning, from my point of view.
Games A and D have the same harmony (- 0.8), but they are dierent in
terms of thinking about deviations (yes/yes for A and no/no for D). At the
same time, by slightly changing the payos of Game A, harmony will change
but not the way of reasoning.
Table 6:
L R
H 4,4 3,1
L 1,3 2,2
The game in table 6 belongs to category A (yes/yes) but now the game
harmony has become positive: it is 0.2. Then, the I-solution (Nash equilib-
rium) remains the same, like the we-solution. But game harmony switches
from a negative value to a positive one, that is from conictual to cooperative
prediction.
Table 7:
L R S
H 2,2 3,0 2,1
L 0,3 2,2 2,1
T 1,2 1,2 1,1
By adding row T and column S to game B (as in tab. 7), the way of
reasoning does not change, but harmony does change: from  1 to -0,7. The
way of reasoning does not change because the added row and column are
dominated from both, I and we point of view. Similarly, by adding row T
and column S to the game C (Hi-Lo game, as in tab. 8), it remains the same
type of game in terms of way of reasoning (no/yes), but harmony changes
(it becomes 0,16, instead of 1).
Table 8:
L R S
H 3,3 1,1 0,2
L 1,1 2,2 2,0
T 2,0 0,2 0,0
The previous examples tell us that perhaps game harmony measure needs
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to be rened. Or better, game harmony is not a strategic way to look at a
game, and then we cannot ask to this measure to embody strategic reason.
And in some way this measure does respect Bacharach's approach to frames.
In fact, in Bacharach's analysis coming to see a frame is a matter of salience,
and games with a high game harmony do make we-solution, and then we-
frame more salient. However, in some ways game harmony measure and my
proposal are linked. In fact, a step forward towards a theory of choice that
takes in account both I and we modes of reasoning might be a comparison
between incentives to deviate from an equilibrium. Take for example the
following games (table 9), that represent PD games with increasingly `game
harmony' measures.
L R
H 3,3 0,5
L 5,0 2,2
L R
H 3,3 1,4
L 4,1 2,2
L R
H 3,3 1.9,3.9
L 3.1,1.9 2,2
Table 9: games with increasing degrees of harmony
The incentive for deviating from a we-equilibrium is measured as the
dierence between the payo in (L,L) and the one in (H,L) for the row
player
10
It means 2 for the rst game, the less harmonious, 1 for the second
and 0.1 for the third, the most harmonious. In the third game, thus, we-
reasoning is more likely to appear than in the rst one. Although further
investigation is needed, this seems to be a promising approach to we-thinking
theory and more in general to decision theory.
10
The game is symmetric and then the result will be the same if we calculate the
incentive for the column player.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper I have analysed Bacharach's theory of we-thinking. In partic-
ular I focused on his attempt to formalize we-thinking in terms of Variable
Frame theory. I found that two main problems arise trying to do it. One is
linked to the endogenization of w, the probability that a person may group-
identify in a determinate situation. The other one is the impossibility, in
Bacharach's framework, to use more than one frame at the same time. This
problem prevents Bacharach from representing his `double-crossing' intuition
in the Prisoner Dilemma game, because it requires an agent to have I-frame
in mind when he is we-thinking. I have proposed a way in which the `double-
cross' intuition may be taken into account: reasoning about deviation from
equilibrium, where equilibrium is seen both from an I and from a we point of
view. This requires that an agent might reason using more than one frame at
time, and it is not a psychological theory. What I have presented it is only a
rst step based on an equilibrium concept. Steps forward might be to verify
if people really endorse this way of reasoning, and to formalize what happens
if some people group-identify and some others do not in this framework, that
is, to allow for the existence of unreliable contexts.
References
[1] BACHARACH, M. (1993): "Variable Universe Games," in Frontiers
of Game Theory, ed. by K. Binmore, A. Kirman, and P. Tani. Mas-
sachusetts: MIT Press.
[2] BACHARACH, M. (1995): "Co-Operating without Communicating,"
London.
[3] BACHARACH, M. (1997): ""We" Equilibria: A Variable Frame The-
ory of Cooperation," Oxford: Institute of Economics and Statistics,
University of Oxford, 30.
[4] BACHARACH, M. (1999): "Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribu-
tion to the Theory of Cooperation," Research in Economics, 53, 30.
[5] BACHARACH, M. (2001): "Framing and Cognition in Economics: The
Bad News and the Good," ISER Workshop, Cognitive Processes in Eco-
nomics.
[6] BACHARACH, M., N. GOLD, and R. SUGDEN (2006): Beyond Indi-
vidual Choice. Princeton University Press.
17
[7] GILBERT, M. (1989): On Social Facts. Routledge.
[8] GOLD, N., and R. SUGDEN (2008): "Theories of Team Agency," in
Rationality and Commitment, ed. by P. Di Fabienne, and S. H.: Oxford
University Press.
[9] HODGSON, D. H. (1967): Consequences of Utilitarianism. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
[10] HOLLIS, M. (1998): Trust within Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[11] HUME, D. ([1739] 1978): A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[12] HURLEY, S. (1989): Natural Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
[13] REGAN, D. (1980): Utilitarianism and Cooperation. Oxford: Claren-
don Press.
[14] SALLY, D. (1995): "Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas:
A Meta-Analysis of Experiment from 1958 to 1992," Rationality and
Society, 7, 58-92.
[15] SUGDEN, R. (1993): "Thinking as a Team: Toward an Explanation of
Nonselsh Behavior," Social Philosophy and Policy, 10, 69-89.
[16] SUGDEN, R. (2000): "Team Preferences," Economics and Philosophy,
16, 175-204.
[17] SUGDEN, R. (2003): "The Logic of Team Reasoning," Philosophical
explorations, 16, 165-181.
[18] SUGDEN, R.(2005): "Fellow-Feeling," in Economics and Social Inter-
actions, ed. by B. Gui, and R. Sugden: Cambridge University Press.
[19] TAN, J., and D. ZIZZO (2008): "Groups, Cooperation and Conict in
Games," The Journal of Socio-Economics, 37, 1-17.
[20] TUOMELA, R. (1995): The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study
of Basic Social Notions. Stanford University Press.
[21] ZIZZO, D., and J. TAN (2003): "Game Harmony as a Predictor of
Cooperation in 2 X 2 Games: An Experimental Study," Oxford: De-
partment of Economics, University of Oxford.
18
